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Environmental Governance of the Arctic: 
Law, Effect, Now Implementation 
Joseph F.C. DiMento* 
J.D., Ph.D., University of California, Irvine 
This Article addresses how the international community governs the 
Arctic and whether that community, or parts of it, should be governing it 
differently. Its core is analysis of programs specifically created to protect and 
manage that regional sea. More broadly, this Article presents the great range 
of policy and regulatory activity that focuses on the environmental quality of 
the region. The aim is not only to describe and evaluate existing governance 
structures but also to indicate how governance can be improved. One 
approach emphasized, rather than or in addition to working on more 
international initiatives, is to focus on implementation of the myriad, almost 
paralyzing, existing international legal obligations. Implementation is 
addressed in the organizational studies context. Implementation in the legal 
sense of executing international law into domestic systems is the starting 
point for our focus on implementation. The research is based on a 
multidisciplinary literature analysis; field visits; and policymaker, scientific, 
and legal expert interviews. I argue that more fully applying knowledge from 
implementation studies can improve Arctic environmental governance, 
irrespective of decisions made about additional legal obligations. 
“[H]e who controls the Arctic controls the world.”1 
 
* Versions of this Article have benefited from the contributions of the participants at the January 2015 
Symposium on Arctic Governance at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. I extend 
particular thanks to the lead commentators on this Article: Professor Robert Lutz, Dr. Kathryn 
Mengerink, and Mr. Brooks Yeager. Dr. Oran Young provided invaluable guidance in the early stages 
of the Article’s conceptualization. Christina Tsou and Betty Lim of the UCI Law Library provided 
invaluable help in updating the literature on implementation. Lisa Payne of UCI Law assisted in the 
production and organization of the original manuscript. 
1. Denis Richard Gibbs, MacKinder Meets Buzan: A Geopolitical Extension to Security 
Complex Theory with an Emphasis on the Polar Regions 235 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Waikato) (on file with the Central Library, University of Waikato) (quoting R. Douglas 
Brubaker & Willy Østreng, The Northern Sea Route Regime: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?, 30 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L LAW 304 (1999)). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes how the international community governs the 
environment of the Arctic and whether that community, or parts of it, should be 
governing the Arctic differently. At this Article’s core is a description of programs 
specifically created to protect and manage that regional sea. More broadly, it 
provides an overview of the great range of policy and regulatory activity that focuses 
on the environmental quality of the Arctic. The aim of this Article is not only to 
describe and evaluate existing governance structures but also to indicate how 
governance can be improved. 
This is a study of a very special case. The United Nations Environmental 
Programme describes the region in this way: “Its terrain varies from high mountains 
to flat plain, wide tundra and great expanses of sea, snow and ice. The plants and 
animals of the Arctic have adapted to these conditions, but this has rendered them 
in some cases more sensitive to increased human activities.”2 
The Arctic is sparsely populated, but much more so than its polar 
counterpart—Antarctica. It has had a significant indigenous people population for 
more than 4000 years.3 According to estimates, one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas 
resources are in the Arctic. In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
estimated that areas north of the Arctic Circle may have thirteen percent of the 
undiscovered oil, thirty percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and twenty percent 
of the undiscovered natural gas liquids on Earth.4 Most of these resources are 
offshore.5 The Arctic is characterized by the presence of important minerals, 
significant biodiversity, and animal and marine life, although there is currently no 
commercial fishing in the high seas of the Arctic. 
By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Arctic may 
be free of ice during the summer months. Concomitant with this change, climate 
change will result in releases of methane from the permafrost and acidification of 
the sea.6 Other atmospheric changes have been identified. High levels of extremely 
reactive molecular chlorine have been discovered in the Arctic atmosphere.7 Oil and 
gas development will bring change and create additional environmental challenges. 
The United States, the Russian Federation, Norway, and Canada are among the 
nations working on exploitation activities in various stages. Some of the nineteen 
 
2. Arctic Region, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/independent/
arctic/ [https://perma.cc/UR2W-3QBE] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
3. See Arctic Chronology, AVATAQ CULTURAL INST., http://www.avataq.qc.ca/en/Institute/
Departments/Archaeology/Discovering-Archaeology/Arctic-Chronology [https://perma.cc/2GMB-
ZTBP] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
4. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic, USGS 
( July 23, 2008, 1:00 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980 [https://perma.cc/
7LXV-3WLH]. 
5. See id. 
6. See Oran R. Young, The Future of the Arctic: Cauldron of Conflict or Zone of Peace?, INT’L AFF., Jan. 
2011, at 185, 187. 
7. See Jin Liao et al., High Levels of Molecular Chlorine in the Arctic Atmosphere, 7 NATURE 
GEOSCIENCE 91, 91 (2014). 
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geological basins making up the Arctic have already experienced oil and gas 
exploration.8 With the opening of this area comes increased resource exploitation 
and a greatly increased volume of shipping though the more easily navigated 
passages, leading to an increased probability of accidents and spills of diesel and 
other fuels. Shipping not only comes with the usual maritime dumpings and leaks, 
but also a potential threat from one of the devices allowing opening of the region 
itself: the immensely powerful nuclear ice-breaking submarine. The environmental 
risks associated with new oil and gas extraction also include associated effects on 
land. Extraction requires the drawing of pipelines across tundra areas, from the 
Arctic shorelines to more densely populated parts of the world. The areas affected 
by such pipelines are sometimes seen as “wasteland” from the perspective of global 
metropoles; however, they can have great importance for the survival of local 
indigenous civilizations—as reindeer pasture, for example. 
All these changes bring to the fore a concern over the international 
community’s ability to manage the fragile environment of the Arctic. Is the existing 
framework adequate? Is it potentially adequate? 
In what follows, I first describe the clusters of laws, policies, and other 
initiatives—national, regional, and international—that are in place to govern the 
Arctic. I then briefly summarize the debate over whether new law, including 
comprehensive Arctic treaty law, is needed. Recognizing that this debate will go on 
for some time and its outcome will not affect my main position, I then focus on the 
need to work with existing law. Converting the law to activity that makes a 
difference in practice—making the law work—is the objective: the implementation 
of existing good initiatives. My objective is to make the law work—that is, to 
convert the law into activity that makes a difference in practice. In other words, I 
argue for the implementation of good existing initiatives. My emphasis on 
implementation comes from a recognition that a paralysis exists in nation state 
compliance with some international laws because of the large number of obligations 
that nations have assumed. In addition, this emphasis results from an appreciation 
that the processes of lawmaking do not include assessment of the feasibility of 
implementing the commitments made. It is often not clear how to put into effect 
legal obligations assumed under international law. The aggregate of commitments 
can be overwhelming. Implementation requires prioritizing and working to make a 
difference on the ground (or, in our case, the sea). Many commitments in the law 
aimed at improving the quality of the environment in the Arctic are not self-
executing, either in the traditional public law meaning of that term, or in the 
meaning focused on here of changing behaviors that link to environmental quality 
of the Arctic. This Article aims to assist in putting into practice necessary changes 
by thinking through specific steps: Who should or must cooperate? By when? With 
what monitoring and reporting obligations? Over what time frame? Who (which 
 
8. See, e.g., Robert Meneley, How to Look at Frontier Basins: An Example from the Canadian  
Arctic (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2015/10724meneley/
ndx_meneley.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VD6-E7LB]. 
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agents) will do what, and by when? 
I therefore lay out my working definition of implementation, distinguishing 
that definition from the traditional use in international public law. Anticipating what 
I develop in this Article, I then lay out lessons that come from several decades of 
analysis of the effectiveness of international environmental and related initiatives—
international environmental law generally, as well as the law governing selected 
other regional seas. Especially useful are implementation correlates in the Baltic 
region and in the Mediterranean. I point out how these lessons emphasize the need 
to make operational the law of the sea, the promising requirements of the Regional 
Seas Programme, and the large marine ecosystems and other ecological institutional 
management concepts. I also lay out some very specific recommendations at the 
end of this Article. The first Part, which can be skimmed by the reader familiar with 
Arctic environmental law, describes the region and inventories the legal framework 
of its governance. 
I. CONTEXT—THE ARCTIC: A REGION OF THE CENTURY 
International attention on the Arctic has increased dramatically in recent years. 
This region is a focus of hope and concern for the twenty-first century. Unlike its 
southern polar counterpart, the Arctic is an ocean—the world’s smallest and most 
shallow.9 There is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic Region.10 “A 
working definition [of the Arctic region] might include ‘the tree line (the 
northernmost boundary where trees grow) or the 10 °C isotherm (the southernmost 
location where the mean temperature of the warmest month of the year is below 
10° C).’”11 Geographically, other [analysts] conclude that [the Arctic through] the 
Arctic Circle begins at 66°, 33” latitude.12 For certain international law purposes, 
the Arctic is defined by memberships in institutions and governance mechanisms 
of the entities in the ‘Arctic region.’”13 
A. Ways of Understanding the Arctic Governance Challenge 
To understand the governance structure that has evolved in the region, one 
 
9. Raz Barnea, What Risks Remain?: Maritime Activity and the New Calculus of Risk in the North 
American Arctic 12 n.32 ( July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466036. 
10. Timo Koivurova & Sébastien Duyck, A New Ocean to Govern: Drawing on Lessons from Marine 
Management to Govern the Emerging Arctic Ocean, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 179, 180 (David Leary & Balakrishna Pisupati eds., 2010). 
11. Joseph F.C. DiMento & Hermanni Backer, Environmental Governance of the Great Seas—The 
Arctic: The Region of the Century, MEPIELAN CTR.: MEPIELAN E-BULLETIN (Feb. 18, 2014) (citing Timo 
Koivurova & Sebastien Duyck, A New Ocean to Govern: Drawing on the Lessons Learned in Marine Management 
to Govern the Emerging Arctic Ocean, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 180 
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might look to theoretical understandings of the international relations of member 
entities( i.e., the Arctic States). However, as Geir Honneland notes, articles on the 
politics of the Arctic have been “largely descriptive, partly speculative.”14 Despite a 
“largely empirical orientation” and the fact that very few articles took theory as their 
point of departure, three major theory traditions are identifiable: realism, 
institutionalism, and constructivism.15 “‘By and large, the journal literature on the 
politics of the Arctic has not contributed to development of theory’—Oran 
Young’s work on the development of institutionalist theory and Iver B. Neumann’s 
work on regime building being exceptional.”16 
Also, a few scholars attempting to understand relevant international dynamics 
have looked to game theory as a heuristic.17 From this perspective, the Arctic region 
holds “possibilities of huge strategic, economic[al], and geopolitical gains (new 
navigation routes, energy resources, minerals etc.).”18 A race among Canada, the 
United States, Russia, Norway, and Denmark may develop as their claims often 
overlap. Coupled with gaps in international law, in this understanding there is the 
potential of a zero-sum game: every state plays for itself. At the same time, the 
possibility of cooperation exists among the rim states. States can create a win-win 
outcome. A zero-sum outcome may result if the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf gives sovereign rights to only some rim states. Even here the zero-
sum could be avoided: some rim states cannot exploit the energy resources. 
The game becomes complicated further as new actors seek to play. Here the 
rim states face a situation of competition with newcomers. Three different 
outcomes are possible: 
[A]ll rim states cooperate to contain the new comers; some rim states allow 
the new comers to enter the game and cooperate with them defecting in 
the view of the other rim states; and thirdly, some of these states act 
independently or they all (newcomers and rim-states) act for themselves. 
Within the first two scenarios we can have a mix zero sum and win-win 
game, while under the last the possibility of a conflict is very high, thus a 
zero-sum outcome is predictable. . . . “[S]tates may be talking cooperation, but 
they are preparing for Conflict”. . . .19 
 
 
14. Geir Hønneland, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC, at xiii, xv (Geir Hønneland 
ed., 2013). 
15. See Øyvind Østerud & Geir Hønneland, Geopolitics and International Governance in the Arctic, 5 
ARCTIC REV. ON L. & POL. 156, 169 (2014). 
16. Joseph F.C. DiMento, Book Reviews, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 299, 
300 (2014); see also Hønneland, supra note 14, at xvi. 
17. See, e.g., Ana-Maria Ghimiș, Rim Versus Non-Rim States in the Arctic Region: 
Prospects for a Zero-Sum Game or a Win-Win One?, ROM. J. EUR. AFF., Sept. 2013, at 36, 
37; see also Scott Cole, Sergei Izmalkov and Eric Sjoberg, Games in the Arctic: applying 
game theory insights to Arctic challenges, POLAR RESEARCH, Aug. 8, 2014. 
18. Id. at 49. 
19. Id. (citation omitted). 
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B. Conditions and Environmental Challenges 
In order to address whether or to what extent the existing legal and governance 
framework is sufficient, we need to know the conditions that are the object of 
intervention. Perhaps not surprisingly, although at some level those conditions for 
some media are known (as is the case for the Great Seas generally), there are many 
gaps in our knowledge.20 The World Ocean Assessment (WOA) will be “the first 
global integrated assessment of the state of the marine environment, including 
socio-economic aspects.”21 
Nonetheless, the status of the Arctic region can be partially described. The 
biodiversity of the region varies with area: the High Arctic is sparsely vegetated, the 
Low Arctic supports more than 600 vascular plant species, the subarctic is a 
transition zone and has 100% plant coverage, and the boreal forest consists of 
coniferous trees.22 Moreover, permafrost reaches 600–1000 meters in the coldest 
areas of the Arctic; wetlands are sparsely distributed and are underlain by 
permafrost; and ice is widespread.23 There is low native species diversity in the 
Arctic and considerable numbers of opportunistic and invasive species. The Arctic 
supports one of the largest seabird populations in the world, over 150 species of 
fish (but low numbers of each), and a variety of marine mammals.24 
1. Temperatures 
“Arctic average temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of 
the world in the past few decades. Widespread melting of glaciers and sea ice and 
rising permafrost temperatures present additional evidence of strong arctic 
warming.”25 Predictions of temperature increases in the region show some 
variability: all five of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) global climate 
models show, with two different emissions scenarios, about a 2 °C temperature rise 
through about 2040. Post-2040, the models diverge, showing increases from around 
4 °C to over 7 °C by 2100.26 
 
20. See JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO & ALEXIS JACLYN HICKMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE OF THE GREAT SEAS: LAW AND EFFECT 1 (2012). 
21. Betsy Baker, A Note on Arctic Information Platforms and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DONAT PHARAND 434, 443 
(Suzanne Lalonde & Ted L. McDorman eds., 2015) (citation omitted). 
22. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ARCTIC REGION 4 (n.d.), 
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/independent/arctic/instruments/
r_profile_pame.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7BW-UDKX]. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, IMPACTS OF A 
WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ACIA) OVERVIEW REPORT 8 (2004), 
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786. 
26. These climate models are computer simulations represented by mathematical equations. 
Major components of the climate system included are the atmosphere, oceans, land surface, snow and 
ice, living things, and the various interacting processes among them. Generally higher confidence exists 
for larger scale projections and greater uncertainty for smaller scales. Id. at 27. 
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In a region as large and diverse as the Arctic, there are significant subregional 
variations in climate. Parts of Canada and Greenland surrounding the Labrador Sea 
have experienced cooling in recent years.27 In the Canadian Arctic, average summer 
temperatures over the last century “are the highest in the last 44,000 years, and 
perhaps the highest in 120,000 years.”28 
2. Atmosphere 
High levels of extremely reactive molecular chlorine have been discovered in 
the Arctic atmosphere: “the first time that molecular chlorine has been measured 
in the Arctic, and the first time that scientists have recorded such high levels of 
molecular chlorine in the atmosphere.”29 
Most expert observers consider climate change to be the greatest threat to the 
Arctic and its most serious challenge. The Arctic is “on the front line” of the climate 
change fight.30 “It has been estimated that . . . the change there will be twice as 
intense as the change in other regions of the world.”31 To be sure, changes in climate 
will provide opportunities for development in the region—with associated benefits. 
The Executive Summary for Arctic Climate Change and Its Impacts demonstrates 
the complexity of the predictions: “The Arctic also provides important natural 
resources to the rest of the world (such as oil, gas, and fish) that will be affected by 
climate change. And melting of arctic glaciers is one of the factors contributing to 
sea-level rise around the globe.”32 The Assessment recognizes that whether a 
particular impact is perceived as negative or positive “often depends on one’s 
interests. For example, the reduction in sea ice is very likely to have devastating 
consequences for polar bears, ice-dependent seals, and local people for whom these 
animals are a primary food source.”33 However, reduced sea ice is likely to increase 
marine access to the region’s resources, expanding opportunities for shipping and 
possibly for offshore oil extraction (although operations could be hampered initially 
by increasing movement of ice in some areas). Also, complicating the issue, possible 
increases in environmental damage that often accompanies shipping and resource 
extraction could harm the marine habitat and health and traditional lifestyles. 
Tree growth in the Arctic could take up carbon dioxide and supply more wood 
 
27. See id. at 18. 
28. Douglas Main, Arctic Temperatures Highest in at Least 44,000 Years, LIVESCIENCE (Oct. 24, 
2013, 11:13 AM), http://www.livescience.com/40676-arctic-temperatures-record-high.html 
[https://perma.cc/22ET-V8G9]. 
29. James Fluere, High Levels of Extremely Reactive Molecular Chlorine Discovered in Arctic Atmosphere, 
SCI. RECORDER ( Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.sciencerecorder.com/news/2014/01/13/high-levels-of-
molecular-chlorine-discovered-in-arctic-atmosphere/ [https://perma.cc/RE4L-7SUR]. 
30. The Newkirk Center for Science and Society, The Role of Law and Governance in Preserving the 
Arctic Environment, YOUTUBE (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEda3E 
bIJys&list=PL1E91860CF029CF95&index=9. 
31. Timo Koivurova, The Dialectic of Understanding Progress in Arctic Governance, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2013). 
32. Hassol, supra note 25, at 8. 
33. Id. 
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products that generate employment and other economic benefits. Tree growth is 
likely to add to regional warming and encroach on the habitat for many birds, 
reindeer/caribou, and other locally beneficial species. Forest fires and insect 
outbreaks may reduce expected benefits. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
notes that “levels of ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth’s surface due to 
stratospheric ozone depletion” may be influenced by climate change on the upper 
atmosphere.34 Arctic ultraviolet radiation levels are likely to remain elevated, 
especially in the spring. These stressors present a range of potential problems for 
human and ecosystem health. 
The probability of accidents and spills of diesel and other fuels increases as 
the number of ships going through the more easily navigated passages increases by 
many times (and oil does not degrade in water at 31ºF). Threats arise not only from 
the usual dumpings and leaks from ships but also from one of the devices that is 
allowing opening of the region itself: the immensely powerful nuclear ice-breaking 
submarine. Nuclear-powered vessels can have important effects on the area. They 
can open up the Arctic to new activities and to increased commerce. When safe and 
controlled, they can be a relatively clean form of energy for some uses in the region. 
However, when problems do arise they can be serious, and the resulting accidents 
can be immensely challenging. 
C. Governance 
“Governance . . . is the totality of activities that seek to provide rational 
effective management of the seas.”35 The term “lack[s] specificity in the literature 
and in public policy considerations. Current calls by international institutions for 
‘good governance’ are not often well-articulated and commonly lead to formless 
outcomes. The activities . . . include[d] within governance come from various 
institutions, broadly defined, including the law.”36 Governance involves the 
activities of a number of international initiatives and regimes. Regimes are the 
aggregation of laws and policies, rules, norms, and institutions that work to achieve 
a common international objective. These partly or fully established systems make 
up the context from which marine environmental management is derived. Their 
foundations, whether strong or weak, create the conditions for processes of 
governance. 
D. The Cluster 
Attempts at governance are numerous and often complicated. Moreover, they 
do not always mesh into a coherent, understandable, and workable framework. I 
use the less optimistic term “clusters” when those characteristics are relevant to 
governance attempts. “Cluster” denotes that collection of initiatives and regimes 
 
34. Id. at 9. 
35. DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 7. 
36. Id. 
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that target a particular international objective. I describe this as less optimistic for 
reasons that follow, but in short, the aggregation of initiatives that focus on a 
phenomenon to be improved may not work together in an effective manner. There 
are many meanings in the social sciences and policy analysis of this term; for the 
present purpose, “cluster” describes the aggregation of attempts to improve the 
Arctic. It is the collection, sometimes coordinated, sometimes less so, of 
international environmental institutions, regimes, and complexes.37 Kal Raustiala 
and David G. Victor (not using the term cluster) speak of a regime complex as “a 
collective of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes” that develop in 
special, often path-dependent ways;38 they are “laden with legal inconsistencies” 
because the rules in one regime are rarely negotiated in the same institution or at 
the same time as rules in related regimes.39 The phenomenon results in part from 
 
37. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE (1998); ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999); Frank Biermann, 
‘Earth System Governance’ as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 
326 (2007); Charlotte N.L. Chambers, Pasua and the Politics of Environmental Management, Tongareva, Cook 
Islands, 124 SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL J. 192 (2008); Thomas Gehring & Sebastian Oberthür, The 
Causal Mechanisms of Interaction Between International Institutions, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 125 (2009); Robert 
O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011); 
Sebastian Oberthür, Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations, 2 INT’L 
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 317 (2002); Sebastian Oberthür & Thomas Gehring, 
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2006, at 1; Konrad von Moltke, Clustering International 
Environmental Agreements as an Alternative to a World Environment Organization, in A WORLD ENVIRONMENT 
ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann & Steffen Bauer eds., 2005). 
38. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 
277, 277 (2004). 
39. See id. 
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increasing institutional density.40 Overlapping, nonhierarchical, often inconsistent, 
often unconditional: these are characteristics of a cluster.41 
E. Arctic Region and Cluster 
For the present case, the cluster is very large. Here I present its major 
components. Readers familiar with Arctic law can move on to the implementation 
analysis below. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the “constitution” for the seas, is of fundamental importance to governance of the 
Arctic.42 UNCLOS directs sovereign activities of Arctic states in the Arctic. The 
fifth Arctic state, the United States, recognizes the main provisions of UNCLOS as 
customary international law.43 
 
40. In the present case, the members of the inventory of legal initiatives cluster together 
relatively high on the axes of environmental protection (x) and the target media as the Arctic (y). Figure 
1 shows the general regional seas conceptualization. Absence of coordination exists internally and 
internationally among those who work to implement cluster initiatives. In some countries, the same 
ministries or agencies are involved for some initiatives. In others, interagency coordination—such as 
between foreign affairs or defense and the environment or trade and agriculture—is not strong. 
Coordination even among allies and affiliate groups (e.g., BRICS, The Group of 77, Europe and North 
America) is often inconsistent and weak. 
 
 
41. See generally Christoph Humrich, Fragmented International Governance of Arctic Offshore Oil: 
Governance Challenges and Institutional Improvement, GLOB. ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2013, at 79, 79–99 
(examining “actor constellations” in fragmented structure of Arctic governance architecture and arguing 
that a joint enabling effort is necessary). 
42. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
43. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (“The United States has not 
ratified [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], but has recognized that its baseline 
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The main principle employed by UNCLOS is that of zoning. Most of the 
world’s nations (now around 160) agree to create demarcations of the waters, 
regulating what can be done within each of these limited arenas. Various elements 
or degrees of sovereignty exist in the zones, from the internal waters to the high 
seas, as Figure 2 shows. 
 
 
Figure 2: UNCLOS Zones (Source: Australian Geological Survey). 
 
In the internal waters, states have absolute sovereignty,44 except for limitations 
created by other treaties or limitations existing under customary international law. 
The next zone is that of the Territorial Seas. These are defined as extending 
twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with the 
Convention.45 In this zone, there exists the right of innocent passage and of transit 
passage. The territorial waters are followed by the Contiguous Zones, extending 
twelve to twenty-four nautical miles measured from the baseline from which the 
territorial sea is measured.46 In this zone, coastal state regulatory authority extends 
over customs, fiscal transactions, immigration, the management of wastes, and 
shipwrecks. 
Beyond these areas are the Continental Shelf (CS) and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The CS is the area where resources and activities of the 
seabed and subsoil under the ocean are controlled. The CS extends throughout the 
natural prolongation of a nation’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin or 200 miles—or more in some circumstances (technology can allow 
extensions). Here, the state holds sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting its natural resources.47 The EEZ governs the resources and activities in 
 
provisions reflect customary international law.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for United States 
at 25 n.6, Alaska, 503 U.S. 569); United States v. Kun Yun Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(declaring that “[t]he United States is not a party to UNCLOS as the Senate has not ratified the treaty,” 
while acknowledging that UNCLOS can reflect customary international law). 
44. See UNCLOS, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 1. 
45. Id. art. 3. 
46. Id. art. 33, paras. 1–2. 
47. See id. art. 76, para. 1; id. art. 77, paras. 1, 4. 
DiMento_Final (No Headers) (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2016  11:27 AM 
2016] ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 35 
the water column and ocean surface and can extend 200 nautical miles from the 
shore; it is generally coextensive with the CS.48 
Beyond these zones are the high seas and within them the “Area” (“the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”), 
where the resources are the “common heritage of mankind.”49 For these resources, 
UNCLOS has established the Enterprise and the International Seabed Authority 
for control and management activities in the Area: “All rights in the resources of 
the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. 
These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, 
however, may only be alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, 
regulations and procedures of the Authority.”50 
Of central interest for our purposes, Part XII of UNCLOS addresses 
environmental protection of the marine environment. Under Article 192, “[s]tates 
have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.”51 This general 
obligation must be fulfilled through the adoption, individually or jointly, of 
measures addressing pollution from various sources, such as ships, land-based 
discharges, seabed exploitation, and dumping. UNCLOS also provides that states 
shall take measures “necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as 
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms 
of marine life.”52 States must also act to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from 
any source using the “best practicable means at their disposal.”53 
UNCLOS includes active obligations on the part of states to protect and 
preserve the marine environment, as well as to cooperate on a global or regional 
basis “directly or through competent international organizations” to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.54 In addition, UNCLOS addresses specific 
pollution sources: “Pollution from Land-Based Sources 1: States shall adopt laws 
and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment 
from land-based sources . . . . Coastal states shall adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising from or in 
connection with sea bed activities . . . .”55 Article 209 covers pollution from 
activities in the Area; Article 210, pollution by dumping; and Article 211, pollution 
from vessels.56 
Under UNCLOS, states have an obligation to take measures for their own 
nationals for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; to cooperate 
with other states in the conservation and management of those resources; and to 
 
48. See id. art. 55; id. art. 56, para. 1; id. art. 57; id. art. 76, para. 1. 
49. Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 136. 
50. Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 137, para. 2; id. art. 170. 
51. Id. art. 192. 
52. Id. art. 194, para. 5. 
53. Id. art. 194, para. 1. 
54. See id. art. 197. 
55. Id. art. 207, para 1; id. art. 208, para 1. 
56. Id. art. 209–11. 
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base those measures on the best scientific evidence available, environmental and 
economic factors, and international standards.57 
A major player in developing rules for activities in the marine environment is 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), both through the use of treaties 
and “soft law” codes. Other relevant laws include the 1972 London Convention58 
regarding the dumping of wastes at sea and MARPOL,59 which manages the 
operational discharge of oil. Article 218(1) of UNCLOS states that “[w]hen a vessel 
is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State,” that State can 
institute proceedings for discharges occurring outside the port state’s territorial sea 
or EEZ.60 
Based on UNCLOS, “it is still very much the coastal states that are responsible 
for managing the ocean . . . the Arctic Ocean is to a large extent subject to the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of its coastal states and art. 234 of the LOS 
Convention even accords those states expanded powers to coastal shipping in the 
ice-covered areas. However, the central Arctic Ocean is high seas.”61 
Other relevant parts of the Law of the Sea that make up part of the cluster are 
articles 64, 65, and 120, which apply to marine mammals in the EEZ. Article 64 
requires states whose nationals fish for highly migratory species to cooperate 
directly or through appropriate international organizations; Article 65 provides that 
coastal states may regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than 
as otherwise provided for in Part B; and Article 120 applies Article 65 to the 
conservation and management of marine mammals in the high seas.62 
F. Territorial Determinants 
Behind many worldwide environmental governance challenges are questions 
of territorial control. Control of land-based pollution and proper maintenance of 
oil exploration, exploitation, and transportation, for example, are functions of 
sovereign nations. When there are areas in dispute, effective environmental 
governance can be stymied. 
In the Arctic there have been surprisingly few disputes. An important potential 
point of tension existed between Norway and Russia in the Novaya Zemlya 
archipelago (Russian side) and the Svalbard archipelago (Norway), but it was 
peacefully resolved in 2010.63 There are a few others. One involves the tiny Hans 
 
57. Id. art. 117–18; id. art. 119, para. 1. 
58. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London Convention]. 
59. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 62 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
60. UNCLOS, supra note 42, at art. 218, para. 1. 
61. Koivurova & Duyck, supra note 10, at 184. 
62. UNCLOS, supra note 42, at art. 64–65, 120. 
63. Andrew E. Kramer, Russia-Norway Pact on Sea Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A12. 
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Island, but even this disagreement may be easily resolved.64 Another involves the 
United States and Russia in the Bering Sea. Here, there has been a negotiated 
maritime boundary of 1,000 nautical miles laying out fishing zones and rights, which 
are respected, although the Russian Duma has not yet ratified the agreement.65 
Another dispute is between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.66 
Terence Andrew Check, Jr. may be an outlier, but he strongly contends that 
“there is still no structure to provide orderly development in the unclaimed and 
disputed Arctic.”67 He also argues that “[a]nother unique issue posed by UNCLOS 
that is exacerbated by the political instability in the Arctic comes from Articles 122 
and 123, where, under a specific interpretation of these articles, the Arctic may not 
be open sea at all, but rather a semi-enclosed sea that conveys additional duties of 
cooperation on the Arctic Five.”68 He concludes that “UNCLOS is silent on the 
issue of appeals of CLCS [(Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf)] 
decisions, and it is unclear if there is any proper or workable way to appeal and 
adjudicate such appeals.”69 Finally, he points out that “it is not even clear if CLCS 
rulings are even binding under customary international law, given the body’s lack of 
history and paucity of rulings.”70 
Finally, there is the 2013 claim to the North Pole by Canada.71 This is an area 
where Russia—and, to a lesser extent, Denmark—have claims.72 However, Canada 
has met its obligation under the ten-year deadline of filing in order to justify 
Continental Shelf claims beyond the 200-mile “default” limit.73 
 
64. See MICHAEL BYERS WITH JAMES BAKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 14–15 
(2013). 
65. See Status of Wrangel and Other Arctic Islands, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/128740.htm [https://perma.cc/D685-69AY]. 
66. There are some who disagree with this sanguine assessment. See Ghimiş, supra note 17, at 
38–40 (“[E]ven the international law could create a zero sum situation in the Arctic, considering the 
fact that following the legal status of the Arctic, everyone has the right to exploit the Arctic resources, 
because it is an international territory . . . ‘[t]he exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall 
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether landlocked 
or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries.’ These provisions 
could be applied to the areas beyond the 200 miles or in the case of an International Court’s decision, 
in which no rim state gains sovereign rights over some Arctic territories.” (quoting G.A. Res. 2749 
(XXV), para. 7 (Dec. 12, 1970))). 
67. Terence Andrew Check, Jr., Finding the Right Forum: The Need for Novel Multilateral Diplomatic 
Solutions to Resolve Competing Territorial Claims Over the Arctic’s Natural Resources (Oct. 30, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347706. 
68. Id. at n.61. 
69. Id. at n.67. 
70. Id. at n.77. 
71. Canada to Include the North Pole in Its Claim for Arctic Territory, Resources, RT QUESTION 
MORE (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:27 AM), http://rt.com/news/canada-arctic-north-pole-claims-965 
[https://perma.cc/3EA6-7RA5]. 
72. See Angelle C. Smith, Note, Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved 
to Prevent the Really Cold War, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2010). 
73. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Seven-Decade Quest to Maximize Canada’s Continental Shelf, 69 
INT’L J. 422, 438 (2014). 
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II. REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND THE REGIONAL  
ASPECT OF A GENERAL OBLIGATION 
A. The Regional Seas 
The Arctic program is a partner program, along with the Antarctic, the Baltic, 
the Caspian, and North-East Atlantic regional seas programs, which are all part of 
the United Nations Regional Seas Programme. Partner programs are less formally 
connected with the UN than other regional seas programs.74 
The Governing Council of UNEP has defined the objective of the Regional 
Seas Programme as the development and implementation of comprehensive action 
plans for the protection and development of specific regional seas areas for 
consideration by Governments concerned and to support their implementation.75 
Usable strategies include those relevant to the Arctic governance question, such as 
the following: promotion of international and regional conventions; guidelines and 
actions for the control of marine pollution and for the protection of aquatic 
resources; assessment of the state of marine pollution and its sources and trends; 
assessment of the impact of pollution on human health, the marine ecosystem, and 
amenities; and coordination of these efforts with regard to the environmental 
aspects of the protection, development, and management of marine and coastal 
resources. 
Common elements of the programs are summarized in Table 2, which 
indicates that the Arctic program is, somewhat in form and somewhat in function, 
a regional seas program. There are calls for formalizing and strengthening the Arctic 
regional seas institution.76 
 
74. Other programs function through an Action Plan. See Regional Seas Action Plans, UNEP, 
http://hqweb.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/actionplans [https://perma.cc/XJJ9-ZEM7] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (explaining the details of Action Plans). In many cases, the Action Plan is 
underpinned with a strong legal framework in the form of a regional convention and associated 
protocols on specific problems. There are now thirteen regional seas programs, of which six are UNEP 
administered. With varying levels of participation, 149 countries (ninety-five percent of the world’s 
states) are a part of programs that include the Black Sea, Wider Caribbean, East Asian Seas (COBSEA), 
Eastern Africa, South Asian Seas, ROPME Sea Area, Mediterranean, North-East Pacific, North-West 
Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, South-East Pacific, Pacific, and Western Africa. About, UNEP, 
http://hqweb.unep.org/regionalseas/about/ [https://perma.cc/E7SB-P6XV] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2016). The programs cover eighteen regions of the world. The Regional Seas Programmes, UNEP,   
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/ [https://perma.cc/4K6X-9SW9] (last visited Mar. 
7, 2016). In Decision 20/20 (1999), the governing council of UNEP endorsed the establishment of a 
regional seas program for the East Central Pacific Region. See Establishment of a Regional Seas  
Programme for the East Central Pacific, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=117&ArticleID=1849&l=en [https://perma.cc/RD6M-BBCZ] (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
75. See UNEP, GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE PREPARATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PLANS FOR THE PROTECTION AND 




76. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS’ REPORT TO MINISTERS (2015),  
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Some programs have as their core activity the creation of regional action plans 
for the protection and development of marine and coastal areas.77 Marine pollution 
control was an original focus of the plans. Later, the focus of the action plans shifted 
to integrated coastal zone planning and management.78 “It also early on became 
 
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/494/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_ 
Iqaluit_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_formatted_v.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC2-QJ5K]; Betsy 
Baker, ICES, PICES and the Arctic Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, 6 U.C. IRVINE  
L. REV. 1 (2016). 
77. These exist for the Mediterranean (1975), Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (1976), Gulf (1978), 
Wider Caribbean (1981), East Asian Seas (1981), West and Central African (1981), South Pacific (1982), 
and Eastern Africa (1985). See The Regional Seas Programmes, UNEP, http://hqweb.unep.org/
regionalseas/programmes/ [https://perma.cc/4K6X-9SW9] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
78. Stjepan Keckes, The Regional Seas Programme–Integrating Environment and Development: The Next 
Phase, in OCEAN GOVERNANCE: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEAS 139, 141 (Peter Bautista 
PROGRAMME   Secretariat 
Yes or no 
Conventions 




Unit: yes or 










Caribbean  Yes Yes - 4 Kingston, 
Jamaica 
Yes No No 
East African 
Region 
Yes Yes - 3 Seychelles, 
Somalia 
No Yes Yes 
East Asian Seas Yes No Bangkok, 
Thailand 
Yes Yes No 
Mediterranean 
Sea 
Yes Yes - 7 Athens, 
Greece 
Yes Yes Yes 
Northwest 
Pacific Region 




Yes Yes - 2 Abidjan, Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Yes Yes No 
 
Regional Seas Coordinating Units of other Institution, not UNEP 
Black Sea  Yes Yes - 4 Istanbul, 
Turkey 
Yes Yes Yes 
North-East 
Pacific Region 
No Yes - 1 No Yes Yes Yes 
ROPME Sea 
Area 
Yes Yes - 5 No Yes No Yes 
Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden  
Yes Yes - 2 Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia 
Yes Yes No 
South Asian Seas Yes No Colombo, 
Sri Lanka 
Yes Yes Yes 
South-East 
Pacific 
Yes Yes - 7 Quito, 
Ecuador 
Yes Yes No 
South Pacific 
Region  
Yes Yes - 3 Apia, Western 
Samoa 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Other Regional Seas Programmes 
Arctic Region Yes No Iceland No No No 
Antarctic Region Yes Yes - 1 Tasmania, 
Australia 
Yes Yes Yes 
The Baltic Sea Yes Yes - 1 Helsinki, 
Finland 
Yes Yes Yes 
Caspian Sea No Yes - 1 Tehran, Iran Yes Yes Yes 
North-East 
Atlantic Region 
Yes Yes - 1 London, 
England 
Yes Yes Yes 
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apparent that land based pollution needed to be controlled if the regional seas were 
to be protected.”79 Several regions adopted legal conventions that commit members 
to protect and enhance the relevant marine environment—usually up to the EEZ. 
High seas, enclosed from all sides by the 200-mile zone of the member states, are 
also included in the convention area in a small number of cases.80 These include 
Cartagena and Noumea. These recognitions have implications for our focus on 
implementation and are addressed below. 
III. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
Whether considered a part of a regional seas framework or not, a main 
evolving component of the governance framework for the Arctic is the Arctic 
Council. 
A. Background 
In 1987, then Soviet Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic 
states could initiate cooperation in various fields.81 In the environmental sector, 
Finland convened a conference of the eight Arctic states in Rovaniemi in 1991. 
There they signed the Rovaniemi Declaration, thereby adopting the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).82 
AEPS was a nonbinding environmental protection agreement among the 
Arctic nations (Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden, and the United States). Some indigenous peoples of the Arctic also are 
represented through the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS). The IPS represents 
three AEPS Permanent Participants: the SAAMI Council (Nordic and Western 
Russia), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (U.S., Canada, Greenland, and Russia), 
and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East 
of the Russian Federation.83 
Adoption of the AEPS was motivated by: the former Soviet Union’s reported 
dumping of radioactive and other hazardous materials into the Arctic Ocean, which 
sent a message to the international community of potential environmental and 
human health threats; the Russian Federation’s willingness to address these 
problems “in their search for bilateral and multilateral assistance to clean up and 
manage present and future problems”; and scientific studies describing “abnormally 
high levels of persistent organic pollutants and heavy metals in Arctic indigenous 
 
Payoyo ed., 1994). 
79. DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 24. 
80. Keckes, supra note 78, at 141. 
81. Paul Arthur Berkman, Arctic Ocean State-Changes: Self Interests and Common Interests, in 1 THE 
YEARBOOK OF POLAR LAW 511, 517–18 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2009). 
82. See Ministerial Direction, EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE,   
http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/reports/ministerial-direction/ [https://perma.cc/R6US-J6GU] 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
83. Bruce A. Russell, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the New Arctic Council, ARCTIC 
RES. U.S., Fall–Winter 1996, at 2. 
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people and their food sources.”84 These pollutants were said to probably result from 
transport mechanisms from northern industrial nations.85 Five programs were 
established under AEPS: 
1. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); 
2. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna program (CAFF); 
3. Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME); 
4. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group 
(EPPR); and 
5. Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU).86 
In 1996, the eight Arctic nations signed a declaration that created the Arctic 
Council.87 This Council is a consensus forum that provides a means for cooperation, 
coordination, and interaction among the eight Arctic states and the Arctic peoples 
(native and others) with regard to common environmental and sustainable 
development issues. The Council subsumed the five AEPS programs. 
The Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council extended the 
terms of reference beyond environmental protection. Although the Council’s 
mandate is quite broad, it does not address issues related to military security.88 The 
Council includes the governments of Canada, Russia, Denmark (including 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, the United States, Sweden, Finland, and 
Iceland, and also, uniquely, the indigenous peoples of the Arctic: the Athabaskan, 
Aleut, Gwich’in, Inuit, Sami, and the forty-one indigenous peoples in Russia 
represented by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North 
(RAIPON).89 
In addition, some states and entities with Arctic interests are involved with the 
Council as observers. Full membership, including voting rights, in the Council is 
restricted to the eight countries with territory in the region. The organizations 
representing the Arctic indigenous peoples have Permanent Participant status, but 
this group is now outnumbered by twelve other states that have been admitted with 
observer status and can attend meetings.90 
 
84. Id. 
85. Ministerial Direction, supra note 82. 
86. Id. 
87. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, art. 2, Sept. 19,  
1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387. 
88. Id. at art. 1, n.1. 
89. Id. at art. 2; Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/NPK6-6UZM]; see 
also The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic, Sept. 16, 1993, princ. 7, 
1993 WL 645202 [hereinafter Nuuk Declaration] (“We recognize the special role of the indigenous 
peoples in environmental management and development in the Arctic, and of the significance of their 
knowledge and traditional practices, and will promote their effective participation in the achievement 
of sustainable development in the Arctic.”). 
90. The observer nations are China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 
27, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers  
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The Council does not have an international legal personality because, under 
international law, that term is used to denote that the entity (separate from its 
members) is recognized under the law and capable of participating as a member in 
international decisions. The term also denotes that the entity (state, international 
company, etc.) has a legal name, rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities, and 
liabilities under law just as any person does.91 
The Council now has a Secretariat and a rotating Chair. The Chair nation has 
responsibility for maintaining the Secretariat, which handles the administrative 
aspects of the Council by calling meetings, managing its website, and circulating 
documents. 
With the major environmental challenges noted above and significant 
geopolitical changes in the region, the Council has evolved from a fairly obscure 
international organization to one of increasing importance in Arctic governance. 
The Council generally creates nonbinding guidelines, but it has taken upon itself a 
convening role for states to consider entering treaties. 
In 2011, the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement became the first binding 
treaty concluded under the Council’s auspices.92 In 2013, the “Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” 
was signed.93 It aims to establish a framework to substantially improve the 
procedures for tackling oil spills in the Circumpolar region. Other agreements under 
negotiation include those on pollution prevention, science, and fisheries.94 
B. Other Entities in the Arctic Cluster 
In addition to the Arctic Council, elements of Arctic environmental 
governance are addressed in other international fora, including the Spitsbergen 
Treaty, the North Atlantic Coastguard Forum, and the Conference of the 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. Moreover, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is developing a draft international code of safety for ships 
operating in polar waters (the Polar Code).95 
 
[https://perma.cc/Y4JE-26Z3]. The European Union has also lobbied for observer status, so far 
unsuccessfully. Lily Haines, EU Bid to Become Arctic Council Observer Deferred Again, BARENTS OBSERVER 
(May 4, 2015), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/eu-bid-become-arctic-council-
observer-deferred-again-04-05 [https://perma.cc/ED38-HR5N]. 
91. See Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 293–94 (1928); Nneoma Chigozie 
Udeariry, To What Extent do International Organizations Possess International Legal Personality?11 (Sept. 15, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2052555. 
92. Steven Lee Myers, Cooperation is Pledged by Nations of the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES,  
May 13, 2011, at A12. 
93. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (May 15, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm [https://perma.cc/
3JCK-22DL] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
94. See Steven Lee Myers, Arctic Council Meets in Shadow of Tension on Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2015, at A7; Steven Lee Myers, Sea Warming Leads to Ban on Fishing in the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2015, at A6. 
95. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), 
Res. MSC.385(94) (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/
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In March 2014, the Arctic Council announced actions to create an Arctic 
Economic Council (AEC) “to foster sustainable development, including economic 
growth, environmental protection and social development in the Arctic Region.”96 
C. Treaties 
Arctic nations are members of international legal initiatives, some of which go 
back several decades. The region is home to a number of multilevel governance 
systems that together comprise what some scholars call the expanding “Arctic 
regime complex.”97 Those that affect most or all of the Arctic states are listed in 
Table 3. 
——————————————————————————————— 
Table 3. Arctic International Law Cluster Components 
 United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of December 1982 Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention) 
 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the 
High Seas 
 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR Convention) 
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
 International Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS) 
 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities 
 The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 
 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter (The London Convention) 
 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) 
 The Kyoto Protocol 




20MEPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VAL-QJHB]; Costas Paris, U.N. Agency Adopts Polar Code to Prevent 
Sea Pollution, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-agency-adopts-polar-code-
to-prevent-sea-pollution-1431711578 [https://web.archive.org/web/20150602002941/http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-agency-adopts-polar-code-to-prevent-sea-pollution-1431711578]. 
96. Agreement on the Arctic Economic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 27, 2014), http://
www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/news-and-press/news-archive/858-agreement-on-
the-arctic-economic-council [https://perma.cc/RGM5-5BCX]. 
97. Oran R. Young, Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times, 41 AMBIO 75, 81 (2012); 
see also ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE (1998). 
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 The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation 
 The CMS or Bonn Convention (The Convention on the Conservation on 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals) 
 The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats (Bern Convention) 
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
 Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from 
 Land-based Activities 
 
Also within the cluster are bilateral agreements (e.g., the 1983 Canada-
Denmark Agreement) and multilateral agreements (e.g., the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty 
signed by Norway, the United States, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas dominions, and 
Sweden). 
D. Soft Law 
Soft law (i.e., generally nonbinding principles that derive from statements in 
international meetings, conferences, and other fora aimed at structuring later actions 
of the members of the international community) is also relevant to the Arctic, at 
least to some of the Arctic states; it includes the Precautionary Principle and the No 
Harm Principle.98 Also relevant are the guidelines of international organizations 
such as the IMO (e.g. Guidelines on Arctic Shipping).99 
Relevant to next steps and the need for additional international law, in 2008 
the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
and the United States) adopted the Ilulissat Declaration, which concluded that there 
is “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern 
the Arctic ocean.”100 Many observers consider this a strong statement of coastal 
 
98. Lisa B. Uffman-Kirsch, The Prevention Principle: A New Theory for Invocation of State 
Responsibility for Marine Environmental Harm (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Utrecht 
University) (on file with author). 
99. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE 
%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED%20BY%20MSC%20AND%20MEPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CB3D-ESTG]. Some see the need for this principle to be hardened in particular sectors. See Nuuk 
Declaration, supra note 89. 
100. The relevant text is: “By virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
large areas of the Arctic Ocean the five coastal states are in a unique position to address these 
possibilities and challenges. In this regard, we recall that an extensive international legal framework 
applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . . Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and 
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the 
marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, 
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement 
of any possible overlapping claims.” The Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362. The Arctic 
coastal states recognizing the increased use of Arctic water for tourism, shipping, research, and resource 
development saw the need to strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic 
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state sovereignty over Arctic matters, as it potentially challenges the eight-member 
Arctic Council.101 
E. Other Cluster Components 
1. Judicial Decisions 
The international dispute resolution fora that have jurisdiction in Arctic nation 
legal controversies are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the European 
Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association 
States, and domestic courts. Each of these judicial bodies makes decisions that 
aggregate, although not literally with precedential value, to the governance 
framework of the Arctic. The international community generally gives respect to 
their decision and their logic and reasoning may be applicable to a governance issue 
in the Arctic. 
Professor Scovazzi has summarized the leading cases on boundary limitations 
in the Arctic, including the 1933 dispute between Denmark and Norway over the 
legal status of Eastern Greenland; the 1977 200-mile fishery protection zone 
adopted by Norway presented to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf; and the 1995 International Court of Justice judgment delimiting the 
Continental Shelf and the superjacent waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen.102 
There has been a small number of important decisions or opinions of direct 
relevance to the environment. For example, in 2013 the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea ordered Moscow to release the Arctic Sunrise and Greenpeace 
protesters who had attempted to scale a drilling platform as part of a protest against 
Arctic oil production.103 Later, the International Court of Arbitration ordered 
Russia to pay compensation for seizing the ship and imprisoning members of its 
crew.104 Indigenous Arctic people brought a petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, alleging that climate change resulting from global 
warming linked to emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States violated their 
rights to maintain a traditional way of life. The petition was dismissed.105 Other 
 
Ocean, “including through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between or among relevant states.” 
Id. 
101. See Klaus Dodds, The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and Arctic 
Ocean, SAIS REV. INT’L AFF., Summer–Fall 2013, at 45, 52–53. 
102. Scovazzi manuscript on file with the author. 
103. The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 22, 2013, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Ord_22_11 
_2013_orig_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/75PY-YSLK]. 
104. Russia Loses Case Over Greenpeace Ship, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 24, 2015),  
http://www.dw.com/en/russia-loses-case-over-greenpeace-ship/a-18669670 [https://perma.cc/ 
3L56-D8PJ]. 
105. Anna Ansari, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United 
States, CLIMATE CHANGE & HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW, http://guides.brooklaw.edu/ 
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opinions have addressed northern fur seals, whaling, and oil pollution.106 
2. National Law 
When describing the elements of the cluster that fit within elements of 
national law, we mean first the exercise of sovereignty in the region, the substantive 
law that guides in that sovereign area, as well as (and further complicating the 
analysis) the extraterritorial reach of national law. 
Sovereignty in the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone established under the 
Law of the Sea regime is exercised through individual nation-state law in a range of 
areas. Substantive law that implicates relationships within the Arctic states and 
relationships between them and other states includes, most importantly for our 
environmental analysis, those requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). In addition to involvement through the Espoo Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment to which all members of the Arctic Council are 
parties and its Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (whose parties 
include Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), national laws requiring an EIA 
are in force in all of the Arctic Council nations.107 
The extraterritorial reach of domestic law addressing environmental 
conditions can have great significance in the Arctic. There are several relevant 
sources, international and domestic. Among the former, Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration imposes upon states the duty to ensure that activity within 
their jurisdiction does not cause damage to the environment of another state or the 
global commons.108 
Domestically, states may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on theories 
of territory, effects, and nationality, as well as to protect a national security 
interest.109 Domestic law sometimes benefits from internal demands to be 
responsive to national or other needs; in such cases it may generate requirements 
not easily agreed to at the international level, for example with regard to processes 
used to harvest marine resources. 
 
c.php?g=330929&p=2223232 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015). 
106. See BYERS, supra note 64, ch. 6, at 171–215. 
107. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 310. 
108. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United Nations: Conference on the 
Human Environment, at princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 ( June 16, 1972). 
109. See Danielle Ireland-Piper, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of the Law 
Undermine the Rule of Law?, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 122, 130–31, 136–38 (2012). The territorial rationale is 
straightforward in addressing a sovereign’s power to regulate environment-related behavior within the 
state’s territory. Id. at 130. The effects touchstone looks to whether activity outside of the state has or 
is intended to have a substantial effect within the territory of the state. Id. The principle of nationality 
holds that a state can extend the effect of its laws based on the nationality of the person or entity such 
as a vessel, whose behavior is targeted. Id. Focusing on the national security of a nation, the protective 
principle recognizes prescription of behavior outside of a state, when conduct is directed against the 
state’s national security. Id. 
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3. Other Regime Components 
There are little bits of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, sometimes called 
the donut hole and the peanut hole, in the Arctic.110 Options as to next steps for 
addressing these “bits” include activity through the existing Law of the Sea regime. 
Here the focus is on implementation of activities in the Areas, for example through 
the increasingly relevant Enterprise, the international organization established under 
UNCLOS to manage the mineral resources of the area under the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind. Existing LOS action in the Areas may need to be 
supplemented through multilateral treaties, perhaps with particular foci including 
environmental protection.111 
4. An Accounting 
The existing Arctic governance system—which we have described 
comprehensively, but no doubt not exhaustively—is large and complex. Yet many 
scholars and policymakers are not sanguine about its adequacy and they call into 
question the effectiveness of the embryonic regime.112 There is, however, a 
considerable and deep split in thinking about the need for new law.113 That split 
reflects the existing political interests and powers of the Arctic states, of the states 
of the Arctic Council, and of Permanent Participants and observers and would-be 
observers. But it also results from very different views of what we should expect as 
effective environmental governance.114 Also of concern in some regional seas 
governance regimes is the question of whether there is too much law resulting in 
“treaty paralysis” that overwhelms smaller and less rich nations without capacities 
to implement—or perhaps even to participate meaningfully—in negotiations; 
however, this does not seem to be a concern for most Arctic stakeholders. 
There is a huge literature debating what to include in an assessment of 
effectiveness of international environmental initiatives, including what should be 
looked at and what methods should be employed.115 An important question relates 
to what social scientists call the counterfactual: What would the conditions of the 
Arctic be in the absence of the cluster? Further, is the outcome of interest physical 
conditions only? Considered the most important indicator by some observers, this 
outcome addresses the extent to which actual conditions, or physical parameters, in 
the seas have changed over time—in our case, since the beginning of the cluster of 
initiatives that have as their goal the maintenance or improvement of the 
 
110. Jon K. Goltz, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United Nations Draft Agreement on 
Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack Fishery, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 443, 444–45 (1995); David L. 
VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 15 Years: Edging Forward in a Sea of Governance Challenges, 54 GER. Y.B. 
INT’L LAW 281, 308 (2011). 
111. See Rosemary Rayfuse, Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 
17 RECIEL 3, 6–13 (2008). 
112. DiMento & Backer, supra note 11. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See DIMENTO & HICKMAN, supra note 20, at 27–29. 
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environmental quality of the Arctic. Or is the state of investigation insufficiently 
developed to look only to physical changes in the giant ocean? Alternate outcomes 
might include, for example, cooperation, which is hopefully a precursor to activities 
that improve the environmental conditions of the Arctic. 
IV. A FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
“Wise people . . . need to craft rules.”116 
In light of the various timetables for predictions of increased challenges to 
Arctic conditions, a process is needed for identifying the most serious problems.117 
Once these problems have been identified and prioritized, the focus moves towards 
implementing methods of solving these problems. In this Article, the focus of 
implementation is on the understanding that derives from studies of organizational 
behavior. Implementation (in the legal sense of executing international law into 
domestic law) may or may not be an activity undertaken first by a nation state; this 
step will depend on factors such as whether a nation is a monist or dualist member 
of the international community,118 whether nation-state actions can proceed 
independent of treaty ratification, etc. Implementation in the sense used in this 
Article is the process of putting into effect policies and legal requirements. Here the 
focus is on making a difference on the ground, actually effecting behavioral changes. 
As Joan Petersilia has noted, “the ideas embodied in innovative social 
programs are not self-executing.”119 Instead, what is needed is an “implementation 
perspective on innovation—an approach that views postadoption events as crucial and 
focuses on the actions of those who convert it into practice as the key to success or 
failure.”120 
Few would argue against the need for work to make effective attempts at 
implementing existing obligations independent of whether new law is indicated. 
Implementation analysis is the stepchild in international studies. Thinking through 
specific steps to carry out legal obligations (“put into practice an activity or program 
of known dimensions”121) may not be as interesting as creating new obligations. But 
to assist in having the law make a difference, more attention needs to be paid to 
questions such as the following: Which entities (agencies, departments, etc.) within 
 
116. Michael Byers, comment during the Arctic Governance symposium at UC Irvine School 
of Law. 
117. See, e.g., ENERGY SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE ARCTIC: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Hooman Peimani ed., 2013); Charles K. Ebinger & Evie 
Zambetakis, The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt, 85 INT’L AFF. 1215, 1215–16 (2009). 
118. For a discussion of the terms “monist” and “dualist,” see Soc’y Am. Law Teachers, A Short 
Primer on U.S. Federalism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) 2 (n.d.), http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/ 
primer_us_federlismintl_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MGG-SFDX]. 
119. Joan Petersilia, Conditions That Permit Intensive Supervision Programs to Survive, 36 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 126, 129 (1990). 
120. Id. (emphasis in original). 
121. DEAN L. FIXSEN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH: A SYNTHESIS OF THE 
LITERATURE 5 (2005). 
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nations are targeted for cooperation? Who is responsible for the first step and 
various subsequent steps in management? Which agency, department, or bureau 
should guide those who are responsible, and according to what timetable? How will 
actions of targeted nations and subnational actors be monitored? What reporting 
mechanisms are required? Finally, what will happen with reports generated by 
monitoring activities? As one successful CEO has described his management 
directive: Tell me “who will do what by when?”122 
Lessons that can guide successful implementation of relevant Arctic-
environmental law can be found in several places: the study of activities in other 
regional seas; case-study work on individual obligations within international 
commitments such as coastal zone management; analysis of international 
environmental agreement-processing of obligations in general; and the general 
knowledge base on implementation. That knowledge base has grown significantly 
in the last decades; however, legal scholars are generally either unaware of it or do 
not see it as their professional obligation to pursue its application.123 
The focus in this Article is on social process: utilizing developed strategies and 
techniques to bring together people who can help define the next steps required to 
make Arctic environmental law effective. It is also important to bring together 
people—often a different set of people—who work for change “on the ground” in 
organizational activities and outputs. 
In addressing implementation, Arctic stakeholders may benefit from lessons 
learned elsewhere. First, in the ongoing developments associated with Arctic 
cooperation, some lessons may come from the successes and failures of efforts in 
other regional seas. 
For example, the value of looking to other regions may be illustrated by the 
work undertaken for the Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response 
regime. During the ongoing negotiations, Baltic cooperation on oil pollution 
preparedness and response under the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was 
offered as a good parallel example from a near-Arctic sea with severe ice winters, 
even if smaller in size.124 With the signing of the Helsinki Convention in 1974, the 
coastal countries of the Baltic managed to foster mutual trust in the middle of the 
Cold War period and create an operational regional response system to pollution 
incidents.125 For more than thirty years, information on ship accidents and response 
 
122. Adam Bryant, Mark Toro of North American Properties: ‘Who will Do What by When?,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/mark-toro-of-north-
american-properties-who-will-do-what-by-when.html. 
123. The literature on implementation is immense. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON 
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN 
OAKLAND 163–64 (3d ed. 1984). Since then, the field has grown in many policy areas. See generally Peter 
L. Hupe, The Thesis of Incongruent Implementation: Revisiting Pressman and Wildavsky, 26 PUB. POL’Y & 
ADMIN. 63 (2011); Keith Smolkowski, Implementation Research, OR. RES. INST., http://homes.ori.org/ 
~keiths/bibliography/implementation.html [https://perma.cc/SR24-V6TZ] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016).  
124. DiMento & Backer, supra note 11. 
125. Id. 
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capacity itself has been shared with a minimum of delay. Joint procedures are tested 
annually in regional HELCOM Balex Delta pollution response exercises at sea.126 
Importantly, the cooperation has also fostered a framework of financial rights and 
obligations clarifying the terms of provision of international assistance.127 These 
activities (obligatory and timely sharing of information, scheduled testing 
requirements, and specific financial commitments) are the hallmarks of successful 
implementation across sectors and challenges. 
To be sure, the Baltic region is one of considerable resources of all kinds, from 
financial to technical. But many of these same countries are also Arctic players. 
In addition to the lessons offered by the study of the regional seas, we can 
learn from the considerable scholarship and policy analysis on international 
environmental governance in general. This work underscores the essential role in 
implementation of cooperation among nations that share both economic and 
environmental protection interests.128 Several decades of analysis suggest that 
among the ideas meriting additional consideration are the exchange of information 
about best practices across the areas of management responsibility (including, but 
not limited to, activities like marine spatial planning and coastal zone management, 
and public participation and consultation)129 and review of “on the ground” 
attempts at Large Marine Ecosystems and other ecological institutional 
management concepts.130 In addition, experiences in other areas of international 
environmental law and management recognize the value of policy issue linkages 
such as seeing climate change as an opportunity to bring greater visibility to the 
Arctic Ocean and region and attract resources associated with concerns over 
mitigation and adaptation.131 
Although the Arctic already has strong institutions and traditions for scientific 
assessments—especially the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP),132 an Arctic Council working group established in 1991—it is important 
to further strengthen the science-policy connection. As elsewhere, this can be 
accomplished by the publication of new information in formats that managers and 
policymakers can easily access and understand as well as by the enhanced sharing 
of data through the use of open source tools and standardized processes. So too 





129. Id. The call for public participation is universal, but it can also be hollow. Within the 
framework suggested herein, roles and activities are identified for those parties who have an interest in 
Arctic environmental protection. In addition to the departments, agencies, NGOs, and others usually 
at the table of program development, effective implementation needs to include indigenous peoples, 
whether Permanent Participants or not, whose activities on the land and in the waters of the Arctic 
ultimately affect environmental protection. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Welcome to AMAP, AMAP, http://www.amap.no/about [https://perma.cc/9R9G-
HYV6] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
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(e.g. between national focal points) can provide a basis for improving cooperation 
among the member states. Existing national entities in many of the Arctic states are, 
it seems, generally quite prepared to transfer relevant information. 
It is crucial to structure cooperation in ways that make existing law and 
initiatives operational and amenable to implementation. One area where this is of 
particular importance in the Arctic is in the identification of an effective means of 
integrating two kinds of knowledge: that which is traditionally called scientific and 
that which is traditional (i.e., from indigenous peoples and from others within the 
regional experience).133 Specific approaches include the use of intercultural 
knowledge-bridgers (previously referred to as boundary spanners) and assisted 
dialogue.134 
A. Case Study: Ecosystems-Based Management 
Implementation analysis is inherently case specific. Identifying relevant and 
implicated actors, management units, social and environmental processes, and 
timetables involved in effective implementation of a policy or legal obligation is not 
a generic task with a set checklist of activities. Implementation is not guided in the 
abstract. Implementation approaches will likely differ across sectors: shipping, oil, 
black carbon pollution, fishing and marine mammal management, and acidification. 
Nonetheless, looking to and across cases can inform what needs to be done in any 
specific sector. 
Several cases in the Arctic create implementation challenges. Among these are 
black carbon reduction, oil spill preparation and response, and ecosystems-based 
management. These differ in their scale, scope, and timing of environmental 
effects—and some are more easily addressed than others.135 
I have chosen as an example ecosystems-based management. Here, managers 
are encouraged to build on ecosystems and other physical and spatial 
conceptualizations of the marine and marine-terrestrial environment. It is one of 
several socioecological, ecological-institutional, or ecosystems-based management 
concepts that have been suggested in national governments, the Arctic Council, and 
other international organizations to assist with effective governance of the seas. 
On several occasions the United Nations has called for consideration of these 
 
133. For concrete examples of indigenous knowledge relevant to the Arctic, see Shelley Wright, 
Inuit Perspectives on Governance in the Canadian Arctic, in POLAR OCEANS GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 189 (Tim Stephens & David L. VanderZwaag eds., 2014). 
134. DONALD N. MICHAEL, ON LEARNING TO PLAN–AND PLANNING TO LEARN (1973); 
Erin L. Bohensky & Yiheyis Maru, Indigenous Knowledge, Science, and Resilience: What Have We Learned from 
a Decade of International Literature on “Integration”?, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Dec. 2011, at 6; Fulvio Mazzocchi, 
Western Science and Traditional Knowledge, 7 EMBO REP. 463 (2006). 
135. In fact, the Council on Councils characterizes the black carbon reduction challenge as 
“relatively easy.” David Runnalls, Next Steps in Arctic Governance, COUNCIL COUNCILS (May 14, 2014), 
http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32983 [https://perma.cc/JDY4-P7TR] 
(“Black carbon is relatively easy to manage (e.g., through improved cooking stoves in India and China 
and better diesel engines and fuel). Controlling these could buy the world some time to address climate 
change more broadly.”). 
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strategies, recognizing the following: 
While there is no single internationally agreed-upon ecosystem approach 
or definition of an “ecosystem approach”, the concept is generally 
understood to encompass the management of human activities, based on 
the best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes, so as 
to ensure that ecosystems structure and functions are sustained for the 
benefit of present and future generations.136  
In 2005, the General Assembly requested that the meeting of the United 
Nations’ open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the 
Sea focus on the ecosystem approaches and oceans.137 Participants suggested 
constitutive elements of an ecosystem approach.138 Later, the General Assembly 
invited States to consider these elements and recalled “that States should be guided 
in the application of ecosystem approaches by a number of existing instruments.”139 
The General Assembly noted in particular the Convention and its implementing 
Agreements and encouraged states to cooperate and coordinate their efforts and to 
“take . . . all measures, in conformity with international law, . . . to address impacts 
on marine ecosystems in areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, taking into 
account the integrity of the ecosystems concerned.”140 
These approaches have been attempted in limited circumstances in some 
regions.141 Integrating knowledge of physical conditions into jurisdictional 
considerations and institutional strategies remains a promising approach. 
However, implementation of these new tools is challenging here, as elsewhere. 
Responsible or potentially responsible institutions have not developed under a 
single lawmaking or policy framework. Contributions to physical assessments are 
not coordinated in a central way, and scientific understandings of the approaches 
to use do not neatly converge. To give one example: Erik J. Molenaar and Alex G. 
Oude Elferink note with regard to OSPAR’s designation of Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs) that “the process after the identification of a potential MPA has to be 
 
136 Ecosystem Approaches, Oceans & L. Sea: Div. Ocean Affairs & L. Sea, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/ecosystem_approaches/ecosystem_approaches.htm [https://perma.cc 
/W4X7-6VBD] (last updated July 21, 2010). 
137. See G.A. Res. 60/30, ¶ 85 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
138. Rep. on the Work of the U.N. Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea at its Seventh Meeting, transmitted by Letter Dated 14 July 2006 from the Co-
Chairpersons of the Consultative Process Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, at 2–5, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/156 ( July 17, 2006). 
139. G.A. Res. 61/222, ¶ 119 (Dec. 20, 2006). 
140. Id. (alteration in original). The General Assembly, in G.A. Res. 62/177, at 5–6 (Dec. 18, 
2007), encouraged States by 2010 to apply “an ecosystem approach” to sustainable fisheries and either 
directly or through regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements (RFMO/As), 
“adopting and implementing conservation and management measures addressing, inter alia, by-catch, 
pollution, overfishing, and protecting habitats of specific concern, taking into account existing 
guidelines of FAO.” The importance of elements of the ecosystems approach was reiterated in G.A. 
Res. 62/215, at 18 (Dec. 22, 2007). 
141. Ecosystem-Based Management, SEAWEB, http://www.seaweb.org/resources/ebm/
implementingebm.php [https://perma.cc/G7LG-RGYG] (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
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carried out in consultation with the competent international organizations. That 
procedure, which might involve half a dozen or more organizations, might make 
the whole process rather cumbersome . . . .”142 They describe some of the required 
“contacts with other organizations.” The international alphabet cluster includes the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), Interntaional Maritime 
Organization (IMO), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North Atlantic 
Marine Mammals Commission (NAMMCO), the North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organization (NASCO), the Authority, and the United Nations 
Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).143 
The science encompassed in evolving ecosystems-based institutional 
approaches is still developing and the complexities of linking physical characteristics 
(themselves often changing) with evolving management understandings are being 
worked through. As with many attempts to have social organizations and their 
members agree upon the value and importance of adopting new or untested 
approaches, resistance can be considerable. These changes also have political 
significance. The responses of governments and regional organizations to initiatives 
that can threaten autonomy, funding, articulated priorities, or control will not always 
be made based on acceptance of the conceptual value of the initiative. 
The Arctic Council itself has called for the use of what it refers to as EBM 
(Ecosystems-Based Management).144 It has made several recommendations with 
regard to institutional development. As to the specific nature of the EBM system, 
it articulated nine constituent principles: 
1. EBM supports ecosystem resilience in order to maintain 
ecological functions and services. 
2. EBM recognizes that humans and their activities are an integral 
part of the ecological system as a whole, and that sustainable use 
 
142. Erik J. Molenaar & Alex G. Oude Elferink, Marine Protected Areas in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: The Pioneering Efforts Under the OSPAR Convention, UTRECHT L. REV., June 2009, at 5, 15–16. 
143. Id. at 16. On the question of the effectiveness of MPAs, University of Tasmania researchers 
studied dozens of marine-protected areas in several countries; they found that almost sixty percent of 
the areas were no better off than areas where fishing was allowed. Five essential characteristics were 
associated with the most successful areas: 
1. Those designated ‘no take’ (allowing no fishing whatsoever), 
2. Those where rules were well enforced, 
3. Those more than ten years old, 
4. Those bigger than 100 square kilometers, and 
5. Those isolated by deep water or sand. 
Areas with four or five of those attributes “had a far richer variety of species, five times the biomass of large 
fish and fourteen times the biomass of sharks, which are indicators of ecological health. Most 
underachieving marine sanctuaries had only one or two of these magic factors, and thus ‘were not 
ecologically distinguishable from fished sites.’” Editorial, To Save Fish and Birds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, 
at SR10. This type of knowledge, disseminated across regions, can assist in implementing what otherwise 
may be a rather vague mandate. 
144. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC (2013), 
 https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/122/MM08_EBM_ 
report%20%281%29.pdf. 
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and values are central to establishing management objectives. 
3. EBM is place-based, with geographic areas defined by ecological 
criteria, and may require efforts at a range of spatial and temporal 
scales (short-, medium- and long-term). 
4. EBM balances and integrates the conservation and sustainable use 
ecosystems and their components. 
5. EBM aims to understand and address the cumulative impacts of 
multiple human activities (rather than individual sectors, species 
or ecosystem components). 
6. EBM seeks to incorporate and reflect, to the extent it is relevant, 
expert knowledge including scientific, traditional and local 
knowledge. 
7. EBM is inclusive and encourages participation at all stages by 
various levels of government, indigenous peoples, stakeholders 
(including the private sector) and other Arctic residents. 
8. Transboundary perspectives and partnerships can contribute 
significantly to the success of EBM efforts. 
9. Recognizing that ecosystems and human activities are dynamic, 
that the Arctic is undergoing rapid changes, and that our 
understanding of these systems is constantly evolving, successful 
EBM efforts are flexible and adaptive.145 
Articulation of ecological criteria, determinations of scales, operational 
definitions of what is sustainable, modeling of cumulative impacts, integration of 
types of knowledge, monitoring: these numerous constituents of EBM do not have 
commonly accepted, consensus meanings. These remain themselves words, not 
implementation. They each require assignment of resources including human 
resources to individual elements with, ideally, specified markers of implementation, 
including deadlines. 
EBM and related principles can be implemented through nation-state actions. 
The U.S. government has articulated fairly detailed operational activities for a related 
goal: the development of integrated ecosystem research in areas of the Arctic.146 
Such programs approximate a level of implementation guidance necessary to 
convert Arctic policy to Arctic environmental protection. The U.S. plan calls for the 
creation of a team to “develop hypotheses about responses to long-term trends, 
build scenarios for future subsistence and commercial use of living marine 
resources, and undertake process studies to inform models to project future 
ecosystem status” through the development of a foundation for new scientific 
research activities. This can be achieved through syntheses and assessments of 
 
145. Id. at 13. 
146. See THE WHITE HOUSE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
THE ARCTIC REGION 17 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_arctic_region_-_fiFalsepdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G5EP-BK3E]. 
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existing data and information and “delineat[ing] and initiat[ing] 3 to 5 year research 
and exploration activities, including mechanisms to integrate interagency and 
international results . . . .”147 The plan also identifies lead agencies for actions and 
for the completion of reporting deadlines.148 
B. International Obligation Processing in General 
Implementation analysis in general is specific to a topic or treaty obligation. 
However, some implementation steps may be relevant across a number of law and 
policy areas. Implementation foci need to be prioritized. In the international arena, 
it is often not clear by whom the foci should be prioritized; therefore, a common 
element of implementation plans is the designation of the lead entity. Once chosen, 
that entity, perhaps in some cases a Secretariat such as the Arctic Council, needs to 
work to reach a consensus on the agenda for actions.149 This itself is a challenging 
task. The entity might need to survey how individual actors (member states, their 
agencies, scientific communities, those with jurisdiction, and other defined 
stakeholders) understand a requirement that must be implemented.150 The entity 
then would assemble these understandings and, through a process such as a Delphi 
approach, create a working understanding of what is required.151 Lawrence 
 
147. Id. 
148. See id. Another example of this level of detail is the following: “Convene a science 
integration conference to demonstrate new and updated cyber-infrastructure tools to enhance data 
integration and application, and to identify opportunities for sharing of technology and tools among 
interagency partners by the end of 2016.” Id. at 17. The program’s responsible actors are the National 
Science Foundation (as the lead agency) as well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (under the aegis of the Department of Commerce), the Department of the Interior, and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as supporting agencies). 
149. Betsy Baker and Brooks Yeager have recommended an Arctic Ocean Coordinating 
Agreement (AOCA) that may have a somewhat similar function. Betsy Baker & Brooks Yeager, 
Coordinated Ocean Stewardship in the Arctic: Needs, Challenges and Possible Models for an Arctic Ocean Coordinating 
Agreement, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 359, 360 (2015). For them, the primary purpose is “to improve and 
regularize coordination of national conservation and management policies in the Arctic.” Id. (describing 
the entity as bringing together experts from national governments and international institutions that 
analyze targeted questions relevant to the Arctic Ocean). 
150. Because the quality of implementation is related to the allocation of specific responsibilities 
among cooperating entities, the Chair of the Arctic Council initially needs to establish very specific 
priorities. It is true that, ideally, the effective governance of the Arctic requires addressing a range of 
challenges. It is also true that the Chair needs to be specific about the most important goals, such as 
addressing black carbon or establishing additional marine reserves. Moreover, the Chair can exert 
pressure on members to undertake very specific tasks, the implementation of which will be closely 
followed. 
151. The Delphi technique developed at RAND gathers data from respondents within their 
domain of expertise. It is designed “as a group communication process which aims to achieve a 
convergence of opinion on a specific real-world issue. The Delphi process has been used in various 
fields of study such as . . . resource utilization to develop a full range of alternatives, explore or expose 
underlying assumptions, as well as correlate judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines.” 
Chia-Chien Hsu & Brian A. Sandford, The Delphi Technique: Making Sense of Consensus, 12 PRAC. 
ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION, Aug. 2007, at 1, 1. See generally Noam Levin et al., Incorporating 
Socioeconomic and Political Drivers of International Collaboration into Marine Conservation Planning, 
63 BIOSCIENCE 547 (2013) (a conservation prioritization). 
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Susskind’s work on stakeholder assessment of fishing priorities in the Arctic 
through the Harvard Program on Negotiation in 2014 (the Harvard study) offers a 
promising model.152 That understanding is then brought back to the policy or 
lawmaking body that has a required schedule for adopting the understanding or a 
modified version thereof. The organizing entity (for example, the Arctic Council 
Secretariat) then would create a schedule, identify lead agencies (sometimes referred 
to as management units)153 for meeting requirements according to the schedule, 
require a response within a certain time, and monitor and report to the policy body, 
or its executive or subsidiary committee responsible for implementation, on 
progress toward goals.154 These are processes used in some efficiently managed 
complex organizations that could be applied to complex multinational law 
activities.155 
D. Scott Slocombe has identified several needs for application and exploration 
in specific cases: data collection including monitoring on past and present system 
functioning; exploration of methods to organize, display, and illustrate the 
relationships of data collected; and synthesis of the data.156 
1. Several Other Steps and Activities Are Common to Successful Implementation: 
a. Monitoring 
Monitoring is a sine qua non across most implementing activities. The Harvard 
study included in its “Gaps in Scientific Knowledge” criterion the need to “develop 
capacity to monitor ocean conditions [in the Arctic]” and the need to “standardize 
and improve monitoring domestically and internationally” as well as “coordinate 
monitoring efforts.”157 Specifically addressing ecosystem-based management, 
Martin Z. P. Olszynski “situates monitoring in its proper context as a prerequisite 
to the successful implementation of ecosystem management (‘EM’), an emerging if 
still not fully understood environmental policy model, the effective implementation 
 
152. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL, STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENT FOR DEVISING SEMINAR ON ARCTIC FISHERIES (2014), 
https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/AFDS_StakeholderAssessment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LRD9-73WY]; see also Courtney Fidler & Bram F. Noble, Stakeholder Perceptions 
of Current Planning, Assessment and Science Initiatives in Canada’s Beaufort Sea, 66 ARCTIC 179 
(2013) (identifying the need for a more coordinated approach to planning and decision making for 
marine resources). 
153. D. Scott Slocombe, Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management, 43 BIOSCIENCE 612, 
618 (1993). 
154. Because the Arctic Council is not a management agency, some have called for this type of 
lead activity to be housed in a separate entity. See Betsy Baker & Brooks Yeager, Coordinated Ocean 
Stewardship in the Arctic: Needs, Challenges and Possible Models for an Arctic Ocean Coordinating 
Agreement, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL L. 359, 360 (2015) (“The AOCS would convene different groupings 
of representatives from national governments and international institutions to bring their expertise to 
bear on targeted questions relevant to the Arctic Ocean.”). 
155. See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S BEST RUN COMPANIES (2006). 
156. Slocombe, supra note 153, at 620. 
157. SUSSKIND, supra note 152, at 11, 16. 
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of which presents its own set of challenges.”158 Monitoring can be done using both 
science-based sites and through local people.159 
b. Improve and Expand Communication Policy 
Communication with other institutions, public and private, can be mandated 
according to specific schedules. “Steps could include better coordination between 
member states in individual forums that are part of the global law of the sea regime 
such as the IMO, and by entering into targeted MOUs with certain of its current 
observers.”160 
c. Strengthen Subregional Mechanisms 
As Suzanne Lalonde notes, “[o]ne such important institution is the forum for 
intergovernmental and interregional cooperation in the Barents Region, the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which covers the northern parts of Finland, Norway 
and Sweden as well as the North-West regions of Russia.”161 
d. Coordinate Legal Regimes 
Connection to the OSPAR network in the North-East Atlantic would likely 
be helpful, for example, for its ecologically representative regional system of MPAs. 
This regime goes beyond the pollution-prevention goal of both the Oslo and Paris 
conventions.162 Lalonde explains that “the Bremen Ministerial Statement . . . 
committed the Commission members to the establishment . . . of a joint network 
of well-managed and ecologically coherent marine protected areas.”163 
e. Identify What Is Lacking in Existing Regimes 
Among the “main gaps in the existing regime of international fisheries fora 
and instruments related to the Arctic Ocean” is a lack of data without which 
 
158. Martin Z.P. Olszynski, Environmental Monitoring and Ecosystem Management in the Oil Sands: 
Spaceship Earth or Escort Tugboat?, 10 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2014). 
159. Finn Danielsen et al., Linking Public Participation in Scientific Research to the Indicators and Needs 
of International Environmental Agreements, CONSERVATION LETTERS, Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 12, 12. 
160. Betsy Baker, The Developing Regional Regime for the Marine Arctic, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 
AND THE POLAR REGIONS: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGIMES 35, 58 
(Erik J. Molenaar et al. eds., 2013) (referring to the marine aspects). 
161. Suzanne Lalonde, Marine Protected Areas in the Arctic, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE 
POLAR REGIONS, supra note 160, at 85, 104. 
162. See id. at 105. In her conclusion, Lalonde cites the work of Chircop et al.: “An essential 
aspect of MPA making . . . is the governance framework . . . . Where MPA cooperation has an 
international dimension . . . the governance framework needs to include a . . . coordinated legal 
arrangement.” Id. at 109 (quoting Chircop et al.) (citation omitted).  
163. Id. at 106. Many MPAs were established, although Sweden’s contribution was modest. Id. 
at 106–07. Norway nominated “three extensive sites around the Svalbard archipelago.” Id. at 107. 
OSPAR’s greatest success story concerns the establishment of MPAs in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction [ABNJ]: “Approximately 40% of the OSPAR Maritime Area is beyond the jurisdiction of 
coastal states and there are three high seas areas within the CAFF Arctic Conservation Boundary.” Id. 
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“[s]cience-based and ecosystem-based fisheries management” cannot be ensured.164 
Outside third parties or management consultants, among others, could undertake 
systematic evaluation of weak or nonexistent elements of regimes. This information 
then would be reported back, for example to the Arctic Council, on a regular 
(defined) schedule. 
f. Implement Through Ongoing Successful Programs and Regime Types 
Existing funds and agencies on national or regional levels have some programs 
relevant to Arctic concerns.  Utilizing them for goals of international environmental 
law poses no insurmountable regional obstacles. After all, despite the existence and 
demands of international treaties and institutions, the nation state remains sovereign 
over many activities that  will be implicated by adopting international goals.165 It 
makes little sense, for example, for Alaskan indigenous peoples to wait for 
international climate change funds to be established to mitigate Arctic 
environmental damage before seeking compensation from the national government 
in which they reside. In fact, it may turn out to be the case that transferring domestic 
planning and programming techniques to the international sphere becomes a major 
element of implementation of some international obligations. 
There is a special subquestion on the larger inquiry about the need for 
additional law. Additional law replicating successful private agreements may provide 
a means for implementation not always available in international public law. Check 
argues, for example, for bilateral investment treaties among the Arctic states: 
If the coastal states were to enter into a bilateral investment treaty 
specifically for the benefit of the oil and gas industry, the diplomatic 
negotiations over such a treaty may accomplish what an [Antarctic Treaty 
System]–style structure, the CLCS, or any one of the formalists’ legal 
‘solutions’ never could: provide the Arctic with a stable legal regime. 
Because bilateral investment treaties often include dispute resolution, 
security, investment protections, and a host of other facilitating 
mechanisms, many of the Arctic’s chilling effects on energy development 
may be avoided.166 
In these “private international law” fora, incentives to implement agreements 
and obligations already exist in the relevant market.167 The Arctic Council has 
commenced action that can facilitate implementation in direct links to private sector 
activities.168 Industry can assist in many ways, for example through the 
harmonization of terms and supplementary third-party verification of required 
 
164. Erik J. Molenaar, Arctic Fisheries Management, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE POLAR 
REGIONS, supra note 160, at 243, 260. 
165. See, e.g., Peter Gullestad et al., Changing Attitudes 1970–2012: Evolution of the Norwegian 
Management Framework to Prevent Overfishing and to Secure Long-Term Sustainability, 71 ICES J. 
MARINE SCI. 173 (2014). 
166. Check, supra note 67. 
167. See id. 
168. Koivurova, supra note 31, at 16–17. 
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reports in the monitoring process.169 Promoting corporate social responsibility 
standards of companies operating in the Arctic is a general means of linking private 
goals to public goods.170 
Successful examples in other regions include the use of specific ad hoc 
mechanisms. In their case study of the Crown of the Continent, Jack Tuholske and 
Mark Foster demonstrated “how subnational actors negotiated a nonbinding 
agreement with reciprocal responsibilities that would protect the North Fork and 
lead to more sustainable, transboundary governance of the entire Crown.”171 The 
factors that led to a successful resolution of this dispute were implemented on both 
sides of the border and included recognition of the role of international law and 
norms, the involvement of subnational political actors, and “the development of a 
nonbinding Memorandum of Agreement.”172 Tuholske and Foster concluded that 
the Memorandum “represents a huge step in transboundary environmental 
cooperation . . . crafted locally to solve a single dispute, has led to significant on-
the-ground protection on both sides of the international border that extend far 
beyond just resolving the dispute over coal mining in a single river drainage.”173 
Memoranda of understanding or agreement are vehicles that can force parties to 
address environmental problems at an operational level. 
Other such detailed customized agreements have been employed in the Arctic 
itself. Subsistence participants and industry participants have entered into 
agreements, for example with regard to whaling.174 
 
169. Gregory L. Rose, Gaps in the Implementation of Environmental Law at the National, 
Regional and Global Level, UNEP REPORT (First Preparatory Meeting of the World Congress on 
Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental Sustainability), Oct. 12–13, 2011, at 15. 
170. See, e.g., Tafsir Johansson & Patrick Donner, The Shipping Industry, Ocean Governance 
and Environmental Law in the Paradigm Shift: In Search of a Pragmatic Balance for the  
Arctic 75–91 (2015). 
171. Jack Tuholske & Mark Foster, Solving Transboundary Pollution Disputes Locally: Success in the 
Crown of the Continent, 92 Or. L. Rev. 649, 653 (2014). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 721. 
174. See, e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] Fisheries, 2012 Open 
Water Season Programmatic Conflict Avoidance Agreement (2012), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
pr/pdfs/permits/bp_openwater_caa2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRB8-WJWM] (agreement between 
oil companies and whaling associations); The AEWC, North Slope Borough, http://www.north-
slope.org/departments/wildlife-management/other-topics/iwc-and-aewc/aewc [https://perma.cc/ 
B4U6-G5AF] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (“Conflict Avoidance Agreement. . . . This agreement 
implements mitigation measures that allow industry to conduct their work while maintaining the 
availability of marine mammals for subsistence hunters. One important aspect of the CAA are time and 
area closures.”); see also, e.g., North Slope Borough, North Shore Borough Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development Policy Positions (n.d.), http://www.north-slope.org/assets/images/uploads/8% 
20points%20NSB%20OCS%20policies%20FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L53-7Y4R]; Jessica S. 
Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design of Process and Law Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 
Envtl. L. Rep. 10893 (2013). Lefevre ties the activity directly to ecosystem-based management, noting 
that the “very general, even theoretical” approach benefits from the “real-world application” of many 
of the approaches and related innovations. Lefevre, supra, at 10902. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The environmental law that makes up the governance framework for the 
Arctic region  is plentiful. It is also at times and in places overlapping, occasionally 
contradictory, or at least conflicting, and almost always challenging for 
implementation across nations. Perhaps some additional treaties—regional, global, 
and bilateral—are needed to improve the environmental quality of this region of 
the century. I argue here that, whatever is decided on the desirability of new law, 
new initiatives should be consistent with—and not counter to—obligations that the 
Arctic nations, and the international community, already face. Considerable 
resources of all kinds are already necessary to make operational existing 
requirements; before adding more obligations, policymakers should take heed of 
the possible resource limitations—economic, technical, and human—that may be 
obstacles to effective law. Implementation work, seldom exciting but often 
gratifying, should be a major focus of international efforts. Some of it is ongoing 
and with some success. There exists a trove of knowledge and experience that can 
expedite meeting on-the-ground and in-the-sea requirements for a cleaner Arctic. 
The work needed is time consuming, labor intensive, and highly technical; it 
involves, on the one hand, use of state-of-the-art information technologies and, on 
the other, recognition of social processes that enhances the probability of actual 
communication, consensus formation, and commitment to action. Implementation 
is a sine qua non for effective protection of the Arctic. 
